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New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger
Policy in the Twenty-First Century
by Joseph J. Warren
This is a policy book written for a wide 
audience: students who want an accurate and 
succinct record of passenger rail in the United 
States and high speed rail in Japan and Europe, 
policy makers, advocates, and skeptics. Perl 
strongly suggests structural change in Amtrak 
and VIA Rail Canada.  Because of the continued 
policy stalemate since the book was published, 
it is especially useful for advocates and policy 
makers. The text is very well supported by 30 
pages of footnotes and a 20-page bibliography. 
The book is logically organized into six 
chapters.  Chapter 1 examines public policies 
that hold the “key” to rail passenger renewal. 
Perl reviews problems in passenger rail in 
North America that ultimately came to the 
point of crisis. He analyzes various groups that 
have an interest in rail policy: “advocates” see 
the success of passenger trains as an end in 
itself and are those with a direct interest in rail 
success, unions, management and suppliers, 
and consumer associations. “Proponents” 
are open to departing from business-as-usual 
practices because of their interest in other 
objectives, such as less congestion.  “Skeptics” 
see passenger trains as technically outmoded 
and economically unpromising. Perl notes 
that public-private partnerships that assisted 
Amtrak’s creation often involve inconsistencies, 
and policy solutions are likely to be pursued on 
an incremental basis. “Policy itself is up for 
grabs.”  This is an accurate description of VIA 
Rail’s and Amtrak’s history.
The policies of rail renewal in Japan and 
Europe demonstrate a difference for the North 
American approach. Japan was able to start 
the first post W.W.II rail renewal in the 1950’s. 
Because the rail market was not mature there 
was little opposition. However, high-speed 
development in Europe as in North America 
was done to reverse industrial decline. In France, 
the TGV is “the best example of post W.W.II 
revitalization in the world.”  In Germany 
regional interests played a much larger resistive 
role than in France.  As a result, ICE trains 
travel over long segments of rehabilitated rather 
than new rail lines, and ICE’s share of total rail 
passenger miles in 1999 was 15% compared 
with 80% for TGV.  Perl believes that success 
of ICE trains is evidence that innovation and 
change can be pursued under less-than-a-fully 
supportive policy environment.
The “New Model” railroad (NMR) is 
explored in depth in Chapter 2.  He uses France, 
Germany and Britain to demonstrate different 
approaches to the NMR and how they developed 
out of the “Regulated Public Monopolies” 
(RPM).  RPM’s showed little innovation, labor 
forces that were too unproductive through 
restrictive work rules, and they were dependent 
on political patrons for their protection. But, 
Britain in the 1980’s and other governments 
in the 90’s began selling off utilities, airlines, 
and public infrastructure. As a result, RPM’s 
started redefining themselves. Managers acted 
like those in private enterprise; labor came to 
see their prosperity was based on satisfying 
customers, not pressing for better legislation; 
and governments saw spending, not as a 
political plum, but as a means to growth.
The NMR in France (SNCF) demonstrated 
organization and management changes such 
as partnerships with auto rental companies 
and airlines. SNCF was able to integrate 
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public interest objectives of shaping urban and 
regional land use, and since there were no job 
reductions, labor was more willing to implement 
work rules changes. The German NMR was 
a balancing act between technical change and 
organizational change. In Perl’s view, Germany 
hasn’t demonstrated either the success of France 
or the failures of Britain—ICE reflected limited 
innovation and organizational change. The need 
to rehabilitate, with massive amounts of capital, 
the severely run-down lines of the former East 
German railway limited new ICE lines. Perl’s 
explanation of the division of the combined 
German system into five entities is easy to 
follow. In the German rail reorganization there 
was no privatization. Technical efforts failed to 
spark a comeback in the 1980’s in Britain. The 
Advanced Passenger Train failed, Perl believes, 
primarily because of the unwillingness of the 
government to put money into infrastructure 
improvement. Later, the 1993 Railways Act 
advocated privatization of all aspects of British 
Rail. He points out problems with the privately 
owned Railtrack, but recognized the success of 
operating companies.
“Amtrak was fundamentally compromised 
by the need to compromise,” Perl says in Chapter 
3, which reviews how “North American Rail 
Passenger Renewal Got Delayed.” He goes into 
the background of Amtrak’s creation in 1971 
and VIA’s in 1977. Both “were organized around 
the principle that focusing new managerial 
resources…would enable a reversal of fortunes 
for this mode.” It didn’t happen, Perl states, 
because the 1958-71 period created an intensely 
adversarial climate that “constrained the search 
for a more effective rail passenger policy.” The 
1958 Transportation Act shifted jurisdiction 
over abandonments to the ICC from the states, 
using a new standard of “public convenience 
and necessity.” By 1971, 75% of 1939 passenger 
mileage had been abandoned. While Perl states 
the railroads lost incentive to renew passenger 
business, he assumes the railroads would have 
been willing to fund expensive improvements 
for higher speed operation needed to keep 
passengers. This is questionable: during the 
1960’s railroads were losing high-value traffic to 
trucks using the interstate highways. The most 
pressing need was to keep the freight traffic 
they had. Arch foes Pennsylvania Railroad and 
New York Central were in such bad financial 
and physical condition they applied to merge 
in 1966. Federal attention was understandably 
focused on the freight railroad problem.
Perl summarizes several states’ efforts 
to overcome the gridlock at the federal level 
in Chapter 4. The Metroliner and follow-on 
Acela are North America’s “sole successes” 
with high-speed rail. The Metroliner was a 
direct outgrowth of federal contracting with 
the Pennsylvania RR and other private partners 
to develop self-propelled electric vehicles. 
The whole project from start to finish took 
four years because of limited infrastructure 
upgrading. Penn-Central’s bankruptcy in 1970 
ended further improvements.
In 1982 the American High Speed Rail 
Corporation, a spin-off from Amtrak, proposed 
a high-speed line between Los Angeles and 
San Diego. The project committed to Japanese 
Bullet train technology at an estimated cost 
of $2.9 billion. The entire amount would 
come from private sources, and there were no 
government guarantees or federal participation. 
The project collapsed in 1984 when $50 million 
in private capital couldn’t be raised. Perl’s 
review of the high-speed plans in Texas and 
Florida capture the essentials of each project. 
In Texas two competing consortia—TGV and 
“Fastrac”—attempted to get approval from the 
Texas High Speed Rail Authority to build high-
speed lines from Dallas to Houston and from 
Dallas to San Antonio. The TGV plan would 
build new track throughout in contrast to some 
upgrading of existing lines as proposed by 
Fastrac. This project was also a totally private 
venture. It ended in 1994 when one of the 
partners withdrew a guarantee for $75 million 
in notes. Perl believes the Texas failure was a 
(sic) “delegitimating” event for proponents of 
market-led renewal. Florida’s project, known 
as the Florida Overland Express, could count 
on $70 million in tax revenues for a minimum 
of 30 years for infrastructure. However, serious 
questions were raised about ridership and 
estimates of “social benefits,” and the project 
was cancelled in 1998.  Perl concludes that 
(1) trying to leapfrog the limitations of Amtrak 
and VIA was not effective, (2) a carrier was 
needed that would manage the planning of the 
technology and infrastructure, and (3) there had 
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to be a translation of national policy to regional 
travel markets.
Chapter 5 reviews the push for Amtrak 
to become commercially self-sufficient. The 
“Claytor commitment” had gotten Amtrak to 
80% cost recovery by 1989. But by the early 
1990’s it was apparent that even “using best 
practices from railroad tradition” Amtrak 
would not close the gap between revenues 
and operating expenses. Tom Downs, who 
became Amtrak’s President in December 1993, 
continued efforts to reduce costs by cutting some 
routes and about 2,000 employees by the end of 
1995. Downs decentralized the decision making 
by establishing strategic business units, but his 
efforts to get changes in work rules bogged 
down. Perl clearly ties the labor issue to loss 
of Democratic support for Downs, but doesn’t 
mention the lost support of Republicans as well. 
George Warrington pursued a growth strategy 
of adding some new routes, extending others 
and greatly expanding express operations. But, 
by 2000, the revenue goals were not being met 
and costs were rising fast. The DOT’s Office of 
Inspector General in a 2000 report pointed out 
that new contracts had boosted labor costs $248 
million above the cost of living, and a review of 
the 2000-04 business plan showed that Amtrak 
was likely to be $1.44 billion short of projected 
results. The IG was uncannily accurate about 
the revenue shortfall. Amtrak was nowhere 
near the requirement of the Amtrak Reform 
and Accountability Act (ARAA) that federal 
operating subsidies end by FY 2003. Perl states 
“Amtrak’s reinvention from within has not 
resolved the political differences on the costs 
of restructuring operations between rail labor, 
taxpayers and states.”  
Perl’s characterization of Down’s and 
Warrington’s initiatives as “reinvention” 
however, is questionable. Failures in traditional 
cost cutting and commercial business expansion 
do not fit his own description of renewal, and 
Amtrak was not reinvented the way SNCF, 
Deutsche Bahn or British Rail was. 
Perl presents a framework for a 
“more productive outcome for passenger 
service” in Chapter 6. VIA and Amtrak 
are so “organizationally encumbered” that 
management will have to pursue more flexible 
operations. The key parameters are where 
government authority, i.e., national, state and 
local should be located, and whether trains 
should be run primarily by the private or public 
sector. Major partnerships are needed, and 
the freight railroads offer the best promise of 
developing major partnerships. There is a “need 
for expanded and modernized rail infrastructure 
across the nation” supported by federal funding. 
He cites Norfolk Southern’s (NS) proposed 
government participation in the $900 million 
cost for a double-tracking project in Virginia. 
Network franchising could work at the national 
level to “return leadership to private enterprise” 
such as that in Britain. 
Some troubling details to national upgrading 
are left out. A major program to upgrade freight 
lines would most likely be needed in the East. 
But NS has stated they would not permit 
passenger trains to go faster than 79 mph 
without improved signaling, and would not 
allow passenger trains to go faster than 90 mph 
in mixed traffic. 
Perl concludes that “incremental 
improvements do little to enable significant 
policy transformation,” but he acknowledges 
California’s successful incremental upgrading 
of Amtrak service. He concludes “governments 
must make commitments to rail renewal 
rather than putting options to a vote,” and that 
“policy changes are needed that enable states 
to spend transportation trust fund revenues 
more flexibly.” However, there is a problem 
here. Building new high-speed systems doesn’t 
just depend on organizational and financial 
arrangements. It also depends on its operating 
and construction costs. The Commercial 
Feasibility Study (September, 1997) provides 
important guidance here. It compared benefits, 
including estimates of savings to passengers and 
airlines from lower congestion costs to total life 
cycle costs for several corridors where airport 
congestion was forecast by FAA. For proposed 
high-speed systems, total benefits only slightly 
exceed costs in California and Texas and they 
were equal in Florida. 
Since the book was published, Amtrak 
entered a financial crisis in FY 2002. Amtrak 
received $300 million in emergency funding 
to avoid bankruptcy and David Gunn became 
president in May 2002. Amtrak could not tell 
him how many employees it had, but it did have 
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84 Vice Presidents. He terminated the expanded 
express service and made consistent reductions 
in staff. From the end of FY 2001 to the end 
of FY 2005 Amtrak had reduced staff by about 
5,700 including loss of the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA) contracts. 
Gunn, himself, was fired in early November 
2005. The Bush administration’s proposals to 
open Amtrak to competition from other carriers 
are consistent with Perl’s conclusion about the 
need for more flexibility in Amtrak. 
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